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I	Introduction	
The	subject	matter	of	this	essay	is	a	certain	understanding	of	the	value	of	equality	which	I	will	
call	‘relational	egalitarianism’	–	a	view	which	locates	the	value	of	equality	not	in	distributions	
but	in	social	and	political	relationships.1	This	is	a	suitable	topic	for	a	contribution	to	a	volume	
based	on	themes	from	the	work	of	G.A.	Cohen	for	(at	least)	two,	somewhat	contradictory,	
reasons.	
	
The	first	is	that	Cohen	was	one	of	the	leading	proponents	of	certain	view	of	distributive	
equality,	which	makes	his	work	a	target	for	relational	egalitarians.	Cohen	was	primarily	a	
reactive	philosopher,	and	it	was	through	his	engagement	with	the	work	of	other	great	figures	
in	contemporary	political	philosophy	–	Rawls,	Nozick	and	Dworkin	–	that	he	himself	became	
one.2	Perhaps	the	positive	thesis	with	which	he	has	become	most	associated	is	the	theory	of	
distributive	justice	or	fairness	which	Elizabeth	Anderson	aptly	dubbed	‘luck	egalitarianism’	(a	
label	which	Cohen	wholeheartedly	adopted).3	Cohen’s	most	detailed	exposition	and	defence	of	
																																								 																				
*	I	am	delighted	to	have	been	asked	to	contribute	to	this	volume	of	essays	in	honour	of	G.A.	Cohen.	
Aside	from	the	deep	philosophical	debt	that	I,	along	with	all	other	contemporary	political	philosophers,	
owe	to	Jerry,	I	am	also	indebted	to	him	personally.	I	did	not	have	the	chance	to	get	to	know	Jerry	well	
on	a	personal	level,	but	as	a	graduate	student	at	Oxford	(and	one	to	whom	Cohen	had	no	special	
responsibilities)	I	found	him	to	be	helpful,	encouraging,	funny,	(usefully)	critical	and	generous.	As	an	
aspiring	member	of	the	political	philosophical	profession	and	community,	this	meant	a	great	deal	to	
me.	I	have	benefitted	from	written	comments	from	Christian	Schemmel	and	Liam	Shields,	and	from	
discussion	with	the	Mancept	group	at	the	University	of	Manchester.	
1	In	using	‘relational	egalitarianism’	in	this	way,	I	am	not	using	the	terminology	in	the	same	way	as	it	is	
employed	by	Andrea	Sangiovanni,	where	‘relational’	theories	hold	that	‘the	practice-mediated	relations	
in	which	people	stand	to	one	another	condition	the	content,	scope,	and	justification’	of	principles	of	
justice.’	See	Andrea	Sangiovanni,	‘Global	Justice,	Reciprocity	and	the	State’,	Philosophy	&	Public	Affairs	
35	(2007):	3-37,	at	5.	I	am	grateful	to	Simon	Caney	for	alerting	me	to	this	different	usage.	
2	Michael	Otsuka	writes:	‘Cohen	found	himself	–	his	philosophical	bearings,	his	theoretical	
commitments,	and	his	distinctive	voice	–	through	a	remarkable	series	of	engagments	with	the	thoughts	
of	others:	not	only	Marx,	but	also	his	contemporaries	Nozick,	Dworkin,	and	Rawls.	Through	his	
engagment	with	them,	he	reached	the	same	heights.’	‘Editor’s	Preface’	in	G.A.	Cohen,	Finding	Oneself	in	
the	Other,	Michael	Otsuka	ed.	(Princenton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2013):	vii-xi,	at	p.	xi.	
3	The	label	originally	appears	in	Elizabeth	S.	Anderson,	‘What	is	the	Point	of	Equality?’,	Ethics	109	
(1999):	287-337.	For	Cohen’s	adoption	of	the	label,	see	his	Rescuing	Justice	and	Equality	(Cambridge,	
Mass:	Harvard	University	Press,	2008),	p.	8.	
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that	position	was	articulated	in	his	1989	essay	‘On	the	Currency	of	Egalitarian	Justice’4,	a	paper	
that	(characteristically)	took	as	its	launching	pad	opposition	to	Ronald	Dworkin’s	thesis	that	
egalitarians	should	care	about	equality	of	resources.5	‘On	the	Currency’	became	Cohen’s	most	
well-known,	and	commonly	cited,	article6	and	he	later	called	the	luck	egalitarian	position	his	
‘animating	conviction	in	political	philosophy	with	respect	to	justice’.	He	described	the	
position	as	follows:	‘an	unequal	distribution	whose	inequality	cannot	be	vindicated	by	some	
choice	or	fault	or	desert	on	the	part	of	(some	of)	the	relevant	affected	agents	is	unfair,	and	
therefore,	pro	tanto,	unjust,	and	that	nothing	can	remove	that	particular	injustice.’7	
	
This	luck	egalitarian	thesis	has	been	challenged	from	a	variety	of	angles,	and	one	of	the	most	
challenging	attacks	has	come	from	relational	egalitarians.	These	theorists	agree	that	equality	is	
an	important	political	value,	but	regard	it	as	one	that	is	primarily	concerned	with	social	or	
political	relationships,	rather	than	distributions.	Relational	egalitarians	such	as	Elizabeth	
Anderson	and	Samuel	Scheffler	have	pressed	specific	arguments	against	the	luck	egalitarian	
position,	including	the	presentation	of	cases	where	luck	egalitarianism	seems	to	get	things	
wrong,	or	at	least	seems	to	give	troubling	answers.	What	animates	their	deeper	resistance,	
however,	is	the	claim	that	luck	egalitarians	have	simply	misunderstood	the	very	basis	of	the	
value	of	equality	–	they	have	taken	it	to	be	a	distributive	ideal,	whereas	egalitarian	
distributions,	so	the	relational	egalitarians	claim,	can	only	have,	at	best,	instrumental	or	
derivative	value	or	importance.	What	egalitarians	should	really	value,	respect,	or	take	as	their	
theoretical	starting	point,	according	to	the	relational	egalitarians,	are	social	relationships	
characterised	by	certain	egalitarian	features,	such	as	equal	respect	and	non-domination	(or,	at	
least,	the	absence	of	relationships	characterised	by	inegalitarian	features).	Egalitarian	
distributions	can	only	be	valuable	insofar	as	they	help	to	promote,	are	expressions	of,	or	are	
demanded	by,	these	valuable	or	important	egalitarian	social	relationships.	
	
So,	relational	egalitarianism	is	an	apt	topic	for	this	volume	because	relational	egalitarianism	
sets	itself	up	as	a	response	and	a	challenge	to	the	luck	egalitarian	view	of	equality,	which	was	
																																								 																				
4	G.A.	Cohen,	‘On	the	Currency	of	Egalitarian	Justice’,	Ethics	99	(1989):	906-944.	(Reprinted	as	ch.1	of	
his	On	the	Currency	of	Egalitarian	Justice,	and	Other	Essays	in	Political	Philosophy,	Michael	Otsuka	ed.	
(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2011).	Chs.	2-6	of	On	the	Currency	also	focus	on	Cohen’s	luck	
egalitarianism.)	
5	Ronald	Dworkin,	‘What	is	Equality?	Part	II:	Equality	of	Resources’	in	Philosophy	&	Public	Affairs	10	
(1981):	283-345.	(Reprinted	as	ch.	2	of	his	Sovereign	Virtue	(Cambridge,	Mass:	Harvard	University	Press,	
2000)).	
6	Michael	Otsuka,	‘Editor’s	Preface’	in	Cohen,	On	the	Currency:	vii-xi,	at	p.	viii.	
7	Cohen,	Rescuing,	p.	7.	
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Cohen’s	‘animating	conviction.’	Somewhat	in	tension	with	that	reason	for	focusing	on	
relational	egalitarianism	is	my	second	reason	for	focusing	on	it:	Cohen	arguably	was	a	
relational	egalitarian.	In	his	last	book8,	the	slender	Why	Not	Socialism?,	Cohen	wrote	about	
two	principles.	The	first	was	the	familiar	luck	egalitarian	principle,	operating	there	under	the	
label	of	‘socialist	equality	of	opportunity’,	which	is	‘the	egalitarian	principle	that	justice	
endorses’.9	But	he	also	wrote	of	a	principle	of	community,	saying	‘“Community”	can	mean	
many	things	but	the	requirement	of	community	that	is	central	here	is	that	people	care	about,	
and	where	necessary	and	possible,	care	for	one	another,	and	too,	care	that	they	care	about	one	
another.’10	Cohen	goes	on	to	delineate	two	‘modes’	of	communal	caring,	one	of	which	has	
independent	distributive	implications,	as	it	‘curbs	the	inequalities	that	result	from	socialist	
equality	of	opportunity’:	‘We	cannot	enjoy	full	community,	you	and	I,	if	you	make,	and	keep,	
say,	ten	times	as	much	money	as	I	do	[even	if	that	is	compatible	with	the	luck	egalitarian	
principle]	because	my	life	will	then	labor	under	challenges	that	you	will	never	face’.11	Since	the	
other	form	of	communal	caring	is	noted	to	be	‘not	strictly	required	for	equality’12,	we	can	take	
it,	I	think,	that	Cohen	thinks	the	first	mode	of	caring	is	necessary	for	equality.	Socialist	
equality	of	opportunity	(and	thus	justice)	is	not	enough	for	true	equality	and	sometimes	will	
be	at	odds	with	it,	it	seems.	Cohen	concludes	that	justice	and	community	may	be	
incompatible	moral	ideals,	but	both	form	part	of	his	egalitarianism.13	This	principle	of	
community	looks	quite	similar	to	relational	egalitarianism.	Although	the	focus	is	on	‘caring’	
rather	than	respect,	recognition	or	anti-domination,	it	nevertheless	condemns	inequalities	
that	are	endorsed	by	luck	egalitarianism	in	the	name	of	another	value	–	a	value	that	tells	us	
that	it	is	better	when	we	are	able	to	recognise	and	empathise	with	one	another’s	struggles;	a	
value	that	tells	us	it	is	better	when	we	live	as	equals.	Further,	late	in	his	life,	Cohen	began	to	
sketch	some	thoughts	on	what	it	is	to	regard	and	treat	others	as	equals.14	Cohen’s	
egalitarianism,	then,	clearly	expanded	beyond	the	distributive	luck	egalitarian	principle.	We	
should	not	be	surprised	by	this.	In	‘On	the	Currency’	Cohen	had	focused	on	accidental	
inequality,	but	had	at	the	outset	declared	that	‘the	primary	egalitarian	impulse	is	to	extinguish	
																																								 																				
8	That	is,	the	last	book	published	while	Cohen	was	alive.	Princeton	University	Press	have	posthumously	
published	three	further	volumes	of	Cohen’s	work:	On	the	Currency;	Finding	Oneself	in	the	Other;	and	
Lectures	on	the	History	of	Moral	and	Political	Philosophy,	Jonathan	Wolff	ed.	(Princeton:	Princeton	
University	Press,	2013).	
9	G.A.	Cohen,	Why	Not	Socialism?	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2009),	p.	13.	Emphasis	in	
original.	
10	Ibid.,	pp.	34-35.	
11	Ibid.,	p.	35.		
12	Ibid.,	p.	35.	
13	Ibid.,	p.	37.	
14	G.A.	Cohen,	‘Notes	on	Regarding	People	as	Equals’	in	his	Finding	Oneself	in	the	Other.	
	 4	
the	influence	on	distribution	of	both	exploitation	and	brute	luck.’15	So,	Cohen	always	saw	
equality	as	more	than	just	luck-neutralized	distributions,	and	the	things	that	he	sought	to	
place	alongside	it	–	anti-exploitation,	community,	regarding	others	as	equals	–	focused	on	the	
ways	in	which	we	treat	one	another	and	live	together.	
So,	relational	egalitarianism	responds	to	and	rejects	Cohen’s	view	of	equality,	but	Cohen	is	
also	possibly	a	member	of	the	relational	egalitarian	fold	–	it	is	a	(less	than	fully	articulated)	
element	of	his	view.	These	are	my,	somewhat	contradictory,	two	reasons	for	focusing	on	the	
relational	view	of	equality	in	this	essay.	
Cohen	may	not	have	fully	articulated	or	defended	his	principle	of	community,	but	relational	
egalitarianism	has	been	expounded	and	defended	by	several	philosophers	in	recent	years.	
These	theorists	have	variously	referred	to	themselves	as	democratic	egalitarians16,	relational	
egalitarians17,	and	non-intrinsic	egalitarians18,	and	include	philosophers	such	as	Elizabeth	
Anderson,	T.M.	Scanlon,	Samuel	Scheffler,	Martin	O’Neill	and	Christian	Schemmel.	All	these	
theorists	share	a	suspicion	of	luck	egalitarianism’s	focus	on	distributive	equality	as	important	
in	and	of	itself.	They	seek	a	firmer	basis	for	thinking	distributive	equality	valuable	or	to	be	
pursued	(if	indeed	it	is),	and	see	the	foundations	of	equality	as	importantly	different.	Thus,	
Anderson’s	question	is	‘What	is	the	Point	of	Equality?’,	seeking	to	uncover	the	foundations	of	
a	commitment	to	equality.	What	lies	at	the	root	of	our	egalitarian	concern?	For	luck	
egalitarians,	the	aim	is	to	compensate	unchosen	or	undeserved	bad	luck.	For	relational	
egalitarians,	according	to	Anderson	at	least,	the	negative	aim	is	to	end	oppression,	whilst	the	
positive	aim	is	to	‘create	a	community	in	which	people	stand	in	relations	of	equality	to	
others.’19	
	
In	some	ways,	relational	egalitarianism	has	(in	the	spirit	of	Cohen)	been	a	reactive	project.	The	
central	articles	in	which	it	is	articulated	are	critiques	of	luck	egalitarianism20,	or	distributive	
																																								 																				
15	Cohen,	‘On	the	Currency’,	908.	My	emphasis.	For	an	examination	of	the	anti-exploitation	element	of	
Cohen’s	thinking	on	distributive	justice,	see	Michael	Otsuka,	‘Justice	as	Fairness:	Luck	Egalitarian,	not	
Rawlsian’,	Journal	of	Ethics	14	(2010):	217-230.	
16	Anderson,	‘What	is	the	Point?’;	Elizabeth	S.	Anderson,	‘Fair	Opportunity	in	Education:	A	Democratic	
Equality	Perspective’,	Ethics	117	(2007):	595-622.	
17	Christian	Schemmel,	‘Why	Relational	Egalitarians	Should	Care	About	Distributions’,	Social	Theory	and	
Practice	37	(2011):	365-390.	
18	Martin	O’Neill,	‘What	Should	Egalitarians	Believe?’,	Philosophy	&	Public	Affairs	36	(2008):	119-156.	
19	Anderson,	‘What	is	the	Point?’,	289.	
20	Anderson,	‘What	is	the	Point?’;	Samuel	Scheffler,	‘What	is	Egalitarianism?’,	Philosophy	&	Public	
Affairs	31	(2003):	5-39.	
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egalitarianism21,	or,	in	Scheffler’s	case,	a	denial	of	a	story	in	which	luck	egalitarianism	has	a	
fully	Rawlsian	heritage.22	In	reply,	luck	egalitarians	have	often	focussed	on	the	fact	that	some	
relational	egalitarians	appear	to	have	taken	the	luck	egalitarian	principle	to	be	a	principle	of	
social	policy,	to	be	applied	directly	and	without	compromise,	rather	than	an	articulation	of	a	
single	pro	tanto	moral	value	among	a	plurality.23	
	
In	this	paper	I	do	not	seek	to	defend	(at	least	directly)	luck	or	distributive	egalitarianism.	
Rather	I	want	to	do	three	things.	My	first	aim	is	to	press	the	same	kind	of	question	that	
relational	egalitarians	press	on	luck	egalitarians	(and	distributive	egalitarians	more	generally)	
back	on	to	relational	egalitarians	themselves.	Luck	egalitarians	tell	us	that	equal	distributions	
are	important,	and	relational	egalitarians	ask	them	to	think	about	why	they’re	important	–	
what	kind	of	value	do	they	have?;	what	is	the	point	of	equality?;	what	lies	at	the	root	of	the	
egalitarian	concern?	The	relational	egalitarians	tell	us	that	egalitarian	social	relationships	lie	at	
the	heart	of	a	concern	with	equality.	But	we	can	(and	should)	then	ask	relational	egalitarians:	
why	should	we	think	these	relationships	morally	important	or	valuable?	
	
Explaining	the	value	or	importance	of	egalitarian	social	relationships,	or	what	kind	of	value	or	
importance	they	are	thought	to	hold,	has	not	played	a	central	role	in	the	articulation	of	
relational	theories	of	equality.24	But	when	relational	egalitarians	have	sought	to	explain	the	
value	of,	reasons	for	fostering,	or	reasons	for	regarding	as	morally	fundamental,	such	
relationships,	interestingly	theorists	who	have	broadly	agreed	with,	and	identified	with,	one	
another	in	their	rejection	of	distributive	egalitarianism	and	in	embracing	an	understanding	of	
equality	founded	in	social	and	political	relationships	have	offered	strikingly	different	
answers.25	
	
																																								 																				
21	O’Neill,	‘What	Should	Egalitarians	Believe?’	
22	Scheffler,	‘What	is	Egalitarianism?’	
23	See,	for	example,	Cohen,	Rescuing,	p.	271.	For	a	more	detailed	response	that	revolves	around	this	
theme,	see	Alexander	Brown,	‘Luck	Egalitarianism	and	Democratic	Equality’,	Ethical	Perspectives	12	
(2005):	293-340.	
24	For	example,	the	central	articulations	of	the	view	are	often	taken	to	be	Anderson’s	‘What	is	the	
Point?’	and	Scheffler’s	‘What	is	Egalitarianism?’,	neither	of	which	focuses	primarily	on	why,	or	in	what	
way,	egalitarian	relationships	are	to	be	thought	valuable	or	important.	
25	Christian	Schemmel	is	rare	in	explicitly	acknowledging	the	differing	foundations	of	relational	
egalitarian	views,	dividing	the	terrain	between	wholly	justice-based	views	of	social	equality	and	non-
wholly-justice-based	views	(‘Why	Relational	Egalitarians	Should	Care	About	Distributions’,	366-367).	As	
I	shall	later	make	clear,	I	think	the	distinction	Schemmel	has	in	mind	is	the	one	I	draw	between	
normative	and	evaluative	views.	
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This	shows,	importantly,	that	there	is	not	one	body	of	thought,	‘relational	egalitarianism’,	but	
rather	a	plurality	of	relational	egalitarianisms	that	differ	in	their	most	fundamental	beliefs	–	
their	beliefs	about	why	equality	in	social	and	political	relationships	is	important,	and	this	then	
leads	to	potential	differences	concerning	how	we	should	distribute,	promote	or	respect	that	
kind	of	value.	This	is	important	because	we	often	think	of	these	thinkers	as	closely	aligned,	
and	they	have	by	and	large	been	happy	to	align	themselves	with	one	another.	In	one	sense,	
rightly	so:	they	do,	of	course,	hold	similar	views	on	how	we	should	view	the	value	of	equality	
and	on	the	importance	of	certain	kinds	of	relationships.	But,	as	I	try	to	show	here,	they	appear	
to	differ	on	why,	or	in	what	way,	these	relationships	matter.	
	
My	second	aim,	in	exposing	these	differing	potential	foundations	for	relational	egalitarianism,	
is	to	show	how	the	position	may	be	vulnerable	to	similar	worries	that	are	expressed	about	
distributive	egalitarianism.	Relational	egalitarianism	may	well	be,	at	the	fundamental	level,	
either	distributive	or	abstract,	which	are	two	of	the	criticisms	that	relational	egalitarians	have	
laid	at	the	door	of	distributive	egalitarians.	
	
Finally,	I	want	to	show	how	once	we	have	a	handle	on	what	kind	of	value	or	importance	
egalitarian	relationships	are	thought	to	have,	realise	or	promote,	it	can	be	shown	that	
relational	egalitarianism(s)	are	compatible	with	distributive	egalitarianism.	Therefore,	the	
distributive	vs.	relational	dichotomy	in	the	literature	on	equality	is	overblown:	we	are	being	
asked	to	choose	when	we	don’t	necessarily	need	to.	I	don’t	deny	that	relational	egalitarians	tell	
us	something	important,	but	I	suggest	that	we	may	be	able	to	house	certain	versions	of	the	
relational	position	within	or	alongside	more	familiar	distributive	theories,	such	as	
maximisation,	sufficiency,	priority	and,	crucially,	distributive	equality.	For	example,	one	
particularly	persuasive	view	of	relational	egalitarianism	–	the	personal	value	view	–	seems	to	
be	operating	on	almost	entirely	distinct	ground	from	distributive	egalitarianism,	and	seems	to	
me	to	require	or	presuppose	a	distributive	view.	Exactly	how	relational	and	distributive	
egalitarianism	may	be	combined	will	differ	according	to	how	the	value	or	importance	of	
relational	equality	is	explained,	but	each	variant	may	offer	some	room	for	distributive	
egalitarianism.	
	
II	Relational	Egalitarianism	
In	this	section	I	will	lay	out	the	relational	egalitarian	view,	and	some	of	the	reasons	that	its	
adherents	believe	it	to	be	superior	to	distributive	views	of	equality.	In	particular,	I	will	
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emphasise	two	(related)	worries	about	distributive	equality:	that	it	is	overly	‘arithmetic’	or	
pattern-focused;	and	that	it	is	overly	abstract	–	under-motivated	and	mysterious.	I	will	then,	in	
the	following	section,	examine	some	statements	that	various	relational	egalitarians	have	made	
that	seem	to	point	toward	differing	answers	that	relational	egalitarians	have	given	to	our	title	
question,	and	will	group	them	according	to	what	type	of	value	or	importance	social	equality	is	
thought	to	have.	
	
The	central	thought	of	relational	egalitarians,	as	I	have	said,	is	that	the	value	of	equality	is	not,	
fundamentally,	about	distributing	goods:	what	matters	is	the	quality	of	social	relationships	
that	people	have.	As	T.M.	Scanlon	puts	it,	the	ideal	is	of	a	society	in	which	people	all	regard	
one	another	as	equals,	and	this	ideal	has,	according	to	Scanlon,	‘played	a	more	important	role	
in	radical	egalitarian	thinking	than	the	idea	of	distributive	justice	which	dominates	much	
discussion	of	equality	in	our	time.’26	According	to	Martin	O’Neill,	our	reasons	for	affirming	the	
importance	of	equality	can	‘best	be	understood	as	elements	that	together	constitute	a	complex	
background	picture	of	how	people	should	live	together	as	equals.’27	Samuel	Scheffler	writes:	
‘Equality,	as	it	is	more	commonly	understood,	is	not,	in	the	first	instance,	a	distributive	ideal,	
and	its	aim	is	not	to	compensate	for	misfortune.	It	is,	instead,	a	moral	ideal	governing	the	
relations	in	which	people	stand	to	one	another.’28	Elizabeth	Anderson	argues	that	‘egalitarians	
should	aim	at	ending	oppressive	social	relations	(which	are	inherently	relations	of	inequality)	
and	at	realizing	society	conceived	as	a	system	of	cooperation	and	affiliation	among	equals.’29	
She	also	says	that	‘Certain	patterns	in	the	distribution	of	goods	may	be	instrumental	to	
securing	such	[egalitarian]	relationships,	follow	from	them,	or	even	be	constitutive	of	them.	
But	democratic	egalitarians	are	fundamentally	concerned	with	the	relationships	within	which	
goods	are	distributed,	not	only	with	the	distribution	of	goods	themselves.’30	
	
Some	of	the	complaints	that	relational	egalitarians	make	about	distributive	equality	focus	on	
its	fundamentally	distributive	nature,	and	(relatedly)	its	abstraction.	O’Neill	complains	that	
when	distributive	inequality	is	seen	as,	in	and	of	itself,	regrettable,	‘the	ideal	of	equality	can	
																																								 																				
26	T.M.	Scanlon,	‘The	Diversity	of	Objections	to	Inequality’	in	Matthew	Clayton	and	Andrew	Williams	
eds.,	The	Ideal	of	Equality	(Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2002):	41-49,	at	p.	43.	For	further	
reflections	on	the	historical	pedigree	of	this	kind	of	thinking,	see	Christopher	Brooke,	‘A	Short	History	
of	Non-intrinsic	Egalitarianism	from	Hobbes	to	Rousseau’	(unpublished	m/s).	
27	O’Neill,	‘What	Should	Egalitarians	Believe?’,	125.	
28	Scheffler,	‘What	is	Egalitarianism?’,	21.	
29	Elizabeth	Anderson,	‘Expanding	the	Egalitarian	Toolbox:	Equality	and	Bureaucracy’	in	Proceedings	of	
the	Aristotelian	Society	Supplementary	Volume,	Volume	LXXXII	(2008),	143.	
30	Anderson,	‘What	is	the	Point?’,	313-314.	
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seem	unduly	obscure	and	abstract:	as	a	merely	arithmetic	goal,	the	value	of	which	it	is	
impossible	to	grasp.’31	He	also	alleges	that	‘On	the	Telic	[egalitarian]	view…the	ideal	of	equality	
can	seem	merely	arithmetic,	instead	of	being	a	properly	intelligible	political	value.	It	is	difficult	
to	understand	why	this	‘merely	arithmetic’	idea	of	equality	should	be	so	important’32	and	that	
this	‘merely	arithmetic’	nature	‘undermines	its	intuitive	appeal,	and	makes	it	excessively	
abstract	and	mysterious	as	a	distributive	view.’33	In	a	similar	vein	T.M.	Scanlon	alleges	that	
‘Opponents	of	equality	seem	most	compelling	when	they	portray	equality	as	a	peculiarly	
abstract	goal	–	conformity	to	a	pattern	–	to	which	special	moral	value	is	attached.’34	According	
to	Anderson,	‘When	we	reconceive	equality	as	fundamentally	a	social	relationship	rather	than	
a	pattern	of	distribution,	we	do	not	abandon	distributive	concerns.	Rather,	we	give	such	
concerns	a	rationale.’35	
	
We	can	draw	two	themes	from	these	criticisms	of	distributive	views	of	equality:	that	they	are	
at	root	distributive	theories,	concerned	with	patterns	and	not	people;	and	that	they	are	
abstract,	mysterious	and	strange	–	they	do	not	connect	with	people’s	lives	or	concerns.	
	
III	Why	are	Egalitarian	Social	Relationships	Valuable?	
Let	us	now	turn	our	attention	to	asking	relational	egalitarians	our	title	question:	what	is	the	
point	of	egalitarian	social	relationships?	As	we	have	seen,	for	relational	egalitarians,	we	must	
aim	to	promote,	or	respect,	egalitarian	social	relationships	(or,	at	least,	to	avoid	inegalitarian	
social	relationships).	But	why	should	we	promote	these	egalitarian	relationships	(or	absence	of	
inegalitarian	relationships)	or	take	such	relationships	to	be	morally	foundational?	What	is	
good	(or	bad)	about	them?	
	
In	the	previous	paragraph	I	have	made	various	parenthetical	qualifications.	These	all	focus	our	
attention	on	whether	relational	egalitarians	seek	to	make	a	positive	claim	or	a	negative	one.	
The	positive	one	would	be	that	egalitarian	social	relationships	are	in	some	way	important,	
good	or	to	be	promoted.	The	negative	one	would	be	that	inegalitarian	social	relationships	are	
in	some	way	bad	or	to	be	avoided.	These	claims	may	sound	equivalent,	but	they	are	not.	
Consider	a	person	who	is	in	an	inegalitarian	relationship.	This	is	bad,	or	to	be	rectified,	on	
either	view.	But	we	can	end	the	inegalitarian	relationship	in	two	ways	–	by	ending	the	
																																								 																				
31	O’Neill,	‘What	Should	Egalitarians	Believe?’,	124.	Emphases	a	mixture	of	original	and	added.	
32	Ibid.,	139.	Emphasis	in	original.	
33	Ibid.,	140.	My	emphases.	
34	Scanlon,	‘The	Diversity	of	Objections	to	Equality’,	p.	42.	My	emphases.	
35	Anderson,	‘Expanding	the	Egalitarian	Toolbox’,	143.	My	emphasis.	
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relationship,	or	by	making	it	egalitarian.	Holding	all	else	fixed	(such	as	the	person’s	non-
relationship-based	welfare)	the	negative	view	gives	us	no	reason	to	prefer	one	response	to	the	
other	–	what	is	important	is	ending	the	inegalitarian	relationship.	The	positive	view,	however,	
would	much	prefer	that	we	make	the	relationship	egalitarian.	I	think	this	is	worth	mentioning	
because	it	is	often	unclear	which	view	relational	egalitarians	have	in	mind.	In	general	
statements	of	the	position	they	will	often	focus	our	minds	on	equal	social	relationships	and	
their	importance,	but	in	their	arguments	they	will	often	focus	on	the	badness	of	inegalitarian	
social	relations.36	Perhaps	this	is	because	relational	egalitarians	start	from	the	factual	premise	
that	there	will	be	social	relationships	either	way,	and	so	the	only	way	to	make	sure	that	there	
are	no	inegalitarian	relationships	is	to	make	relationships	egalitarian.	For	example,	Elizabeth	
Anderson	takes	as	her	fundamental	starting	point	the	ideal	of	a	democratic	state,	writing:	
‘In	liberal	democratic	versions	of	social	contract	theory,	the	fundamental	aim	of	the	
state	is	to	secure	the	liberty	of	its	members.	Since	the	democratic	state	is	nothing	more	
than	citizens	acting	collectively,	it	follows	that	the	fundamental	obligation	of	citizens	
to	one	another	is	to	secure	the	social	conditions	of	everyone’s	freedom…	[Democratic	
egalitarianism]	claims	that	the	social	condition	of	living	a	free	life	is	that	one	stand	in	
relations	of	equality	with	others.’37	
	
Given	this	starting	point,	in	which	we	begin	with	the	idea	of	society	(and	state),	it	may	be	that	
there	is	nothing	but	scholastic	hairsplitting	at	issue	between	the	positive	and	negative	thesis	–	
we	are	going	to	have	social	relationships,	so	we	just	need	to	decide	whether	we	want	
egalitarian	or	inegalitarian	ones.	This	may	be	so,	but	nevertheless,	for	reasons	theoretical	
clarity,	I	would	be	interested	to	know	what	really	animates	the	relational	egalitarian:	is	it	that	
we	should	want	and	try	to	ensure	that	egalitarian	social	relationships	(and	thus	social	
relationships)	exist;	or	is	it	that	we	should	seek	to	eradicate	the	badness	of	inegalitarian	
relations,	and	be	indifferent	as	to	whether	or	not	social	relationships	exist?	This	may	not	
matter	only	as	a	matter	of	theoretical	clarity.	For	example,	the	views	will	possibly	differ	on	
who	exactly	is	harmed	by	inegalitarian	social	relationships.	On	the	negative	view,	it	is	possible	
that	only	the	oppressed	are	harmed,	and	they	should	be	the	locus	of	our	concern.	On	the	
positive	view,	where	egalitarian	social	relationships	are	valuable,	if	they	are	valuable	because	
they	make	lives	go	better,	then	both	oppressed	and	oppressors	are	harmed	by	inegalitarian	
																																								 																				
36	See,	for	example,	Scanlon,	‘The	Diversity	of	Objections	to	Inequality’,	who	seems	entirely	focussed	on	
the	badness	of	inegalitarian	relationships,	but	makes	a	positive	general	statement.	An	exception	to	this	
is	Martin	O’Neill,	‘What	Should	Egalitarians	Believe?’,	who,	I	think,	makes	it	clear	that	he	supports	the	
positive	view,	believing	fraternal	relationships	to	be	valuable.	
37	Anderson,	‘What	is	the	Point?’,	314-315.	
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relationships.	In	addition,	the	views	may	differ	as	to	how	they	direct	us	beyond	the	confines	of	
our	existing	communities.	If	egalitarian	social	relationships	are	good,	perhaps	we	ought	to	go	
out	beyond	our	communities	and	form	more.	If	inegalitarian	social	relationships	are	simply	
bad,	however,	we	should	merely	ensure	not	to	form	new	inegalitarian	relationships,	but	we	
will	have	no	special	reason	to	go	out	and	form	new	egalitarian	ones.	
	
However,	I	am	going	to	set	aside	such	concerns	here.	I	will	generally	focus	what	it	is	that	is	
thought	to	be	valuable	or	important	about	egalitarian	social	relationships,	even	though	
answers	to	this	question	will	often	focus	on	what	is	disvaluable	or	elimination-worthy	about	
inegalitarian	relationships.	In	other	words,	I	accept	the	reasonable	assumption	that	there	will	
be	social	relationships,	so	the	question	is	how	they	should	look,	and	why.	Before	turning	to	
what	some	relational	egalitarians	have	said	about	this	issue,	it	will	be	worth	making	some	
distinctions	between	different	kinds	of	claims	in	moral	and	political	theory.	The	first	is	
between	a	normative	and	evaluative	claim.	Normative	claims	concern	what	we	ought	(not)	to	
do;	evaluative	claims	about	what	would	make	things	better	(or	worse).	Consequentialists	seek	
to	make	all	normative	claims	in	terms	of	evaluative	ones,	but	not	everyone	is	a	
consequentialist.	The	second	and	third	distinctions	are	within	the	category	of	evaluative	
claims.	They	are	cross-cutting,	so	the	category	‘evaluative	claims’	can	be	seen	as	a	two-by-two	
matrix.	Along	one	axis	the	distinction	is	made	between	instrumental	and	intrinsic	value	–	
things	are	instrumentally	valuable	when	they	promote	something	of	intrinsic	value;	
intrinsically	valuable	things	are	valuable	in	and	of	themselves.	Along	the	other	axis	is	the	
distinction	between	impersonal	and	personal	value.	Something	is	personally	valuable	if	it	is	
good	because	it	is	good	for	someone.	Happiness	is	a	personal	value	–	it	is	valuable	(if	it	is)	
because	it	is	good	for	someone.	Impersonal	values	are	not	good	for	anyone;	they	are	just	good.	
Telic	egalitarians	see	equality	as	being,	or	as	serving,	an	impersonal	value.	In	punishment	
theory,	retributivists	see	deserved	punishment	as	having	impersonal	value.38	Both	distributive	
equality	and	punishment	are	seen	as	(in	one	way)	good,	even	when	they’re	not	good	for	
anyone.	
	
Let	us	now	turn	to	what	relational	egalitarians	have	said	about	why	and	in	what	way	the	
relationships	they	favour	are	important,	valuable	or	worthy	of	promotion.	Doing	so	will	
																																								 																				
38	On	both	equality	and	retributive	justice,	see	Larry	S.	Temkin,’Equality,	Priority,	and	the	Levelling	
Down	Objection’	in	Clayton	and	Williams	eds.,	The	Ideal	of	Equality:	126-161.	On	retributive	justice	as	an	
impersonal	value,	see	my	‘Retributivists!	The	Harm	Principle	is	not	for	you!’	in	Ethics	124	(2014):	272-
298.	
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involve	quoting	them	at	length,	as	their	answers	are	often	complex.	The	problem,	as	Samuel	
Scheffler	sees	it,	is	as	follows:	
‘the	basic	reason	it	[equality]	matters	to	us	is	because	we	believe	that	there	is	
something	valuable	about	human	relationships	that	are,	in	certain	crucial	respects	at	
least,	unstructured	by	differences	of	rank,	power	or	status.	So	understood,	equality	is	
in	some	ways	a	puzzling	value	and	a	difficult	one	to	interpret.	...	[I]n	order	to	
understand	the	value	of	equality,	one	needs	to	investigate	the	specific	respects	in	
which	egalitarian	relationships	must	be	free	from	regimentation	by	considerations	of	
rank	or	status.	One	needs	to	characterize	in	greater	detail	the	special	value	that	
egalitarian	relationships	are	thought	to	have	and	to	consider	which	differences	of	
authority	or	status	have	the	capacity	to	compromise	that	value.’39	
	
Many	relational	egalitarian	writings	seem	to	claim	that	egalitarian	relationships	have	personal	
value	–	they’re	good	for	the	people	involved	(or,	negatively,	inegalitarian	social	relationships	
are	bad	for	the	people	involved).	For	example,	consider	the	following	passages.	Scheffler	says	
that	one	reason	we	may	take	such	relationships	to	be	valuable	is	that,	collectively,	we	think	
they	are	–	the	idea	of	equal	citizenship	is	implicit	in	the	public	political	culture	of	modern	
democratic	society,	and	as	such	represents	a	point	of	normative	convergence.40	However,	he	
also	offers	a	more	‘philosophically	venturesome’	account	of	what	makes	egalitarian	social	
relationships	valuable,	which	puts	the	focus	firmly	on	the	value	of	such	relationships	to	
individual	lives:	
‘[L]iving	in	a	society	of	equals	is	good	both	intrinsically	and	instrumentally.	When	the	
relationships	among	a	society’s	members	are	structured	by	rigid	hierarchical	
distinctions,	[this	account]	claims,	the	resulting	patterns	of	deference	and	privilege	
exert	a	stifling	effect	on	human	freedom	and	inhibit	the	possibilities	of	human	
exchange.	Because	of	the	profound	and	formative	influence	of	basic	political	
institutions,	moreover,	patterns	of	deference	and	privilege	that	are	politically	
entrenched	spill	over	into	personal	relationships	of	all	kinds.	They	distort	people’s	
attitudes	toward	themselves,	undermining	the	self-respect	of	some	and	encouraging	an	
insidious	sense	of	superiority	in	others.	Furthermore,	social	hierarchies	require	
stabilizing	and	sustaining	myths,	and	the	necessity	of	perpetuating	and	enforcing	these	
myths	discourages	truthful	relations	among	people	and	makes	genuine	self-
																																								 																				
39	Samuel	Scheffler,	‘Choice,	Circumstance	and	the	Value	of	Equality’,	Politics,	Philosophy	&	Economics	
4	(2005):	5-28,	at	18.	
40	Ibid.,	18.	
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understanding	more	difficult	to	achieve.	In	all	of	these	ways,	inegalitarian	societies	
compromise	human	flourishing;	they	limit	personal	freedom,	corrupt	human	
relationships,	undermine	self-respect	and	inhibit	truthful	living.	...[Whereas]	an	
egalitarian	society	helps	to	promote	the	flourishing	of	its	citizens...[and]	to	live	in	
society	as	an	equal	is	a	good	thing	in	its	own	right.’41	
	
Scanlon	writes:	
‘‘it	is	an	evil	for	people	to	be	treated	as	inferior,	or	made	to	feel	inferior’…	[This]	
statement	of	this	objection	[to	inegalitarian	social	relationships]	was	cautiously	
ambivalent.	It	consisted	of	two	parts,	the	first	of	which	suggests	that	what	is	
objectionable	is	a	certain	form	of	treatment	(being	treated	as	inferior,	or	not	being	
‘treated	as	an	equal’)	and	the	second	suggests	that	the	evil	is	an	experiential	one	(being	
made	to	feel	inferior).	More	needs	to	be	said	about	how	this	‘experiential’	component	
is	to	be	understood	and	about	how	it	is	supposed	to	be	related	to	the	underlying	forms	
of	treatment	in	order	to	give	rise	to	the	objection	in	question.	
The	experiential	evil	involved	here	can	be	characterized	in	several	different	ways	–	
indeed,	there	are	several	different	kinds	of	experience	that	one	might	have	in	mind.	Let	
me	distinguish	two	broad	categories.	The	first,	more	‘individualistic’,	characterization	
emphasizes	what	might	be	called	damage	to	individuals’	sense	of	self-worth…The	
second	category	emphasizes	damages	to	the	bonds	between	people:	what	might	be	
called	the	loss	of	fraternity…Unlike	the	first,	this	is	a	loss	suffered	by	the	better	off	and	
worse	off	alike.’42																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
	
Elizabeth	Anderson	also	suggests	that	the	value	of	non-oppressive	social	relationships	to	
individual	lives	is	at	the	foundation	of	her	commitment	to	relational	equality:	
‘To	be	subject	to	another’s	command	threatens	one’s	interests,	as	those	in	command	
are	liable	to	serve	themselves	at	the	expense	of	their	sub-ordinates.	It	threatens	
subordinates’	autonomy,	their	standing	as	self-governing	individuals.	Without	
substantial	controls	on	the	content	of	legitimate	commands,	subjection	can	also	be	
degrading	and	humiliating...Such	a	condition	of	subjection	to	the	arbitrary	wills	of	
others	is	objectionable	in	itself,	and	has	further	objectionable	consequences:	timidity	
																																								 																				
41	Ibid.,	19.	My	emphases.	
42	Scanlon,	‘The	Diversity	of	Objections	to	Inequality’,	p.	51.	Empahses	a	mixture	of	original	and	added.	
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and	self-censorship	in	the	presence	of	superiors	–	or	worse,	grovelling	and	self-
abasement.’43	
	
Later	in	the	same	paper,	Anderson	states	that,	‘the	quest	for	freedom	is	the	quest	for	a	mode	of	
relating	to	others	in	which	no	one	is	dominated,	in	which	each	adult	meets	every	other	adult	
member	of	society	eye	to	eye,	as	an	equal.’44	And,	as	we	have	already	seen,	she	argues	that	‘In	
liberal	democratic	versions	of	social	contract	theory,	the	fundamental	aim	of	the	state	is	to	
secure	the	liberty	of	its	members…	[Democratic	egalitarianism]	claims	that	the	social	
condition	of	living	a	free	life	is	that	one	stand	in	relations	of	equality	with	others.’	Here	
egalitarian	relationships	appear	to	be	important	because	they	are	necessary	for	freedom.	It	is	
implied,	further,	that	freedom	is	good	for	people,	or	necessary	for	people’s	good.	That	freedom	
is	an	intrinsic	or	instrumental	personal	good	is	implied	by	Anderson’s	appeal	to	‘social	
contract	theory’,	since	in	such	theories	the	things	that	people	pursue	(primary	goods,	security	
etc.)	are	the	things	that	will	help	them	lead	good	lives.	
	
Martin	O’Neill	writes:		
‘The	reasons	to	which	Non-Intrinsic	egalitarianism	appeals	are	themselves	generated	
by	distinctively	egalitarian	concerns	with	the	badness	of	servility,	exploitation,	
domination,	and	differences	in	status.	The	badness	of	these	outcomes	can	best	be	
understood	by	virtue	of	the	contrasting	value	of	certain	kinds	of	fraternal,	egalitarian	
social	relations.	The	existence	of	these	kinds	of	social	relations	should	itself	be	seen	as	
intrinsically	valuable,	independent	of	the	positive	effects	that	such	relations	may	have	
for	individual	welfare.’45	
	
O’Neill	attaches	a	footnote	to	this	text,	in	which	he	adds:	‘Recall	that,	as	Parfit	puts	it,	“we	may	
think	it	bad	for	people	if	they	are	servile	or	too	deferential,	even	if	this	does	not	frustrate	their	
desires,	or	affect	their	experienced	wellbeing”’.46	
	
																																								 																				
43	Anderson,	‘Expanding	the	Egalitarian	Toolbox’,	145-146.	My	emphasis.	
44	Ibid.,	146.	
45	O’Neill,	‘What	Should	Egalitarians	Believe?’,	130.	
46	Ibid.,	130,	n.	30.	My	emphasis.	I	have	included	this	quotation	of	the	footnote	because	from	O’Neill’s	
main	text,	one	could	suppose	that	he	meant	to	say	that	egalitarian	social	relationships	have	impersonal	
value,	and	are	therefore	intrinsically	valuable	not	only	aside	from	experiential	welfare	considerations,	
but	also	aside	from	considerations	of	human	flourishing	or	wellbeing	altogether.	O’Neill	does,	as	we	
shall	see,	think	that	egalitarian	social	relationships	could	have	impersonal	value,	but	I	don’t	think	that	is	
what	he	is	arguing	here:	the	Parfit	quotation,	while	keeping	our	focus	away	from	experienced	wellbeing,	
maintains	that	servility	and	deference	are	bad	for	people.	
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What	all	these	statements	concerning	the	value	of	equality	in	social	relationships	have	in	
common	is	that	they	all	seem	to	assert	that	egalitarian	social	relationships	are	good	for	people	
–	or	at	least	that	inegalitarian	social	relationships	are	bad	for	people.	That	is	to	say,	they	all	
seem	to	assert	that	egalitarian	social	relationships	have	personal	value.	However,	notice	that	
divisions	are	already	beginning	to	show	between	different	relational	egalitarians.	A	lot	of	
reasons	for	thinking	egalitarian	social	relationships	valuable,	and	inegalitarian	ones	bad,	are	
mentioned	in	the	above	statements.	In	particular,	Anderson	and	O’Neill	throw	our	gaze	on	the	
dominated	or	oppressed,	arguing	that	being	dominated	and	oppressed	is	bad	for	us.	Scheffler	
and	Scanlon,	however,	whilst	not	ignoring	the	plight	of	the	oppressed,	are	more	open	to	the	
possibility	that	inegalitarian	relationships	are	bad	for	both	sides	(since	they	‘inhibit	truthful	
living’	and	our	understanding	of	ourselves,	and	mean	a	‘loss	of	fraternity’).	Of	course,	it	
doesn’t	show	much	to	show	that	different	thinkers	focus	on	different	aspects	of	the	badness	of	
inequality	–	shock!	philosophers	may	disagree	with	one	another!	–	but	it	is	worth	highlighting,	
because	these	thinkers	have	largely	been	happy	to	associate	themselves	with	one	another’s	
work47,	and	will	easily	be	associated	with	each	other	by	others,	due	to	the	closeness	of	their	
views	in	certain	ways,	and	the	fact	that	the	way	in	which	their	views	cohere	(an	emphasis	on	
social	relationships	rather	than	distributions)	has	been	the	focus	of	their	writings,	whilst	the	
areas	where	they	seem	to	differ	(their	foundational	reasons	for	believing	egalitarian	
relationships	to	matter)	has	not.	The	reality,	however,	is	that	while	there	is	agreement	at	the	
level	of	the	rejection	of	distributive	egalitarianism	and	the	broad	reasons	why,	there	appears	to	
be	disagreement	about	what	values	and	principles	ultimately	underpin	the	position.	
	
In	addition,	whilst	there	appears	to	be	agreement	in	the	above	statements	that	egalitarian	
social	relationships	are	good	for	people,	there	is	little	agreement	or	clarity	over	whether	such	
relationships	have	intrinsic	or	instrumental	value	to	us.	Scheffler	explicitly	says	they	have	
both,	but	does	not	delineate	which	of	the	reasons	he	gives	are	instrumental	and	which	
intrinsic,	nor	does	he	explain	what	the	intrinsic	values	served	by	(if	instrumental)	or	
instantiated	in	(if	intrinsic)	these	relationships	are.	All	we	get	is	an	assurance	that	such	
relationships	promote	‘human	flourishing’	(leaving	us	in	no	doubt	that	the	value	is	personal),	
but	it	is	left	entirely	unclear	whether,	say,	‘truthful	living’	is	to	be	thought	of	as	instrumental	
to	a	good	life;	a	distinct,	sui	generis	form	of	human	flourishing;	or	directly	contributing	to	
																																								 																				
47	Scheffler	identifies	his	critique	with	Anderson’s	(‘Choice,	Circumstance	and	the	Value	of	Equality’,	25,	
n.7),	whilst	O’Neill	identifies	his	theory	closely	with	Scanlon	(‘What	Should	Egalitarians	Believe?’,	122,	
126,	130,	132,	133,	139),	and,	to	a	lesser	degree,	with	Anderson	and	Scheffler	(130).	Schemmel	identifies	his	
view	with	Anderson	and	Scheffler	(‘Why	Relational	Egalitarians	Should	Care	About	Distributions’,	365).	
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some	more	ultimate	human	good,	like	happiness	(i.e.,	not	instrumental	to	human	happiness,	
but	constitutive	of	it).	Anderson,	however,	seems	to	see	egalitarian	social	relationships	as	
largely	instrumentally	valuable.	Inegalitarian	relationships	are	disvaluable	because	they	
‘threaten	one’s	interests’	(although	she	also	says	that	subjection	is	‘objectionable	in	itself’).		
Furthermore,	egalitarian	relationships	are	valuable	because	they	are	necessary	for	freedom,	
which	appears	to	be	the	ultimate	good	we	are	seeking	to	provide	in	Anderson’s	architectonic.48	
	
Scanlon,	like	Scheffler,	seems	to	see	a	mix	of	intrinsic	and	instrumental	value.	The	disvalue	of	
inegalitarian	relationships	for	those	at	the	bottom	is	the	loss	of	self-respect	–	making	
inegalitarian	relationships	instrumentally	disvaluable	–	whilst	fraternal	social	relations	seem	
to	be	held	up	as	intrinsically	valuable,	part	of	the	good	life.	
	
However,	not	all	relational	egalitarians	have	seen	the	value	of	egalitarian	social	relationships	
as	personal	(instrumentally	or	intrinsically).	Martin	O’Neill	posits	that	such	relationships	may	
be	impersonally	valuable	–	not	valuable	because	they	are	good	for	people,	but	valuable	because	
they	are	good	in	and	of	themselves	(even	when	they	actually	make	people’s	lives	go	worse).	In	
his	discussion	of	Parfit’s	well-known	‘levelling	down	objection’49,	O’Neill	considers	a	case	of	
two	distributions:	
(1)	Half	at	100,	Half	at	150	
(2)	Everyone	at	9950	
	
The	levelling-down	objection	is	that	telic	egalitarians	would	have	to	say	that	(2)	is	in	some	way	
better	even	though	everyone	is	worse	off,	which,	so	the	objection	claims,	is	implausible.	
O’Neill	sides	with	the	telic	egalitarian	here,	saying	that	the	relational	or	non-intrinsic	
egalitarian	should	agree	that	(2)	could	be	in	some	way	better.	He	writes:	
‘Distribution	(1)	might	represent	an	affluent	but	class-ridden	society,	marked	by	forms	
of	servility,	domination,	and	exploitation.	The	Non-Intrinsic	Egalitarian	should	think	it	
in	one	way	preferable	to	move	from	such	a	society	to	a	more	egalitarian	society	(as	in	
(2))	even	if	this	adversely	affected	each	person’s	level	of	all-things-considered	well-
being.	This	is	because	the	Non-Intrinsic	egalitarian	can	allow	that	certain	kinds	of	
egalitarian	social	relations	have	a	value	that	is	not	reducible	to	the	effects	on	individual	
																																								 																				
48	See	also,	‘What	is	the	Point?’,	289:	‘Democratic	equality	guarantees	all	law-abiding	citizens	effective	
access	to	the	social	conditions	of	their	freedom	at	all	times.’	
49	Derek	Parfit,	‘Equality	or	Priority?’	in	Clayton	and	Williams	ed.,	The	Ideal	of	Equality:	81-125,	at	p.	98	
50	In	O’Neill,	‘What	Should	Egalitarians	Believe?’,	141,	these	are	numbered	(3)	and	(4).	In	the	quotation	
that	follows,	I	have	substituted	my	numbers	for	his.	
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welfare	that	those	social	relations	may	have.	…This	may	sound	counterintuitive,	but	
such	a	position	is	not	at	all	mysterious.	If	we	think	that	certain	egalitarian	values	have	
a	significance	that	is	independent	of	the	effects	of	equality	on	individual	well-being,	
then	we	may	think	that	the	value	of	equality	can	sometimes	trump	the	value	of	
maximizing	(or	a	fortiori	of	merely	increasing)	well-being.’51	
	
Recall	that,	at	the	outset,	I	distinguished	between	normative	and	evaluative	claims.	So	far	we	
have	looked	at	why	egalitarian	social	relationships	may	be	thought	to	be	valuable,	personally	
or	impersonally.	And,	of	course,	some	normative	claims	may	piggy-back	on	those	values.	But	
egalitarian	social	relationships	can	also	be	understood	in	a	more	purely	normative	light	–	not	
as	valuable	per	se,	but	rather	as	fundamentally	morally	important,	as	a	starting	point	for	
normative	claims.	This	way	of	looking	at	egalitarian	social	relationships	doesn’t	see	them	as	
something	to	be	promoted,	a	kind	of	value,	but	rather	as	a	methodological	starting	point.	
Principles	of	justice,	on	this	view,	are	expressions	of	or	proceed	from	our	fundamental	
commitment	to	social	equality.	Christian	Schemmel	offers	such	an	account	of	the	importance	
of	egalitarian	social	relationships.	He	finds	O’Neill’s	view	that	egalitarian	relationships	are	
impersonally	valuable	‘mysterious’52	(which	is,	of	course,	exactly	what	O’Neill	accuses	
distributive	views	of	being,	and	exactly	what	he	denies	his	claims	as	being)	and	proposes	a	
view	in	which:	
‘Relational	egalitarianism...is	a	view	about	social	justice;	its	aim	is	to	specify	rights	and	
duties	that	individuals	have	as	members	of	society,	and	which	normally	override	other	
social	values...The	objection	to	[inegalitarian]	relationships	is	not	merely	that	they	are,	
in	some	sense,	bad	for	people,	but	that	they	constitute	unjust	treatment:	domination	
involves	subjection	to	the	arbitrary	exercise	of	power	on	the	part	of	somebody	else;	
marginalization	involves	an	unjust	denial	of	opportunities	to	participate	in	basic	social	
and	political	institutions.’53	
	
																																								 																				
51	Ibid.,	141-142.	See	also,	146:	‘[W]e	may	believe	that	the	sort	of	fraternal,	egalitarian	social	relations	that	
result	from	distributive	equality	are	valuable	in	some	way	that	is	simply	irreducible	to	any	gain	for,	or	
benefit	to,	any	particular	individual.	We	may	believe	that	such	relationships	have	a	basic	moral	
significance	that	is	not	exhausted	by	their	value	for	any	particular	individual.’	Emphasis	in	original.	
52	Christian	Schemmel,	‘Relational	Egalitarian	Distributions’	(unpublished	m/s).	This	paper	later	
became	‘Why	Relational	Egalitarians	Should	Care	About	Distributions’,	but	this	particular	passage	was	
deleted.	I	don’t	believe	that	this	amendment	reflected	a	change	of	heart	in	the	author	on	this	issue,	
however.	
53	Schemmel,	‘Why	Relational	Egalitarians	Should	Care	About	Distributions’,	366.	In	this	quotation	
Schemmel	seems	focussed	on	the	negative	view	–	the	justice-based	imperative	is	to	end	inegalitarian	
relationships,	not	produce	egalitarian	ones.	
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Schemmel	gives	credence	to	the	idea	that	what	is	disvaluable	about	inegalitarian	relationships	
is	their	personal	disvalue	–	they	make	people’s	lives	go	worse.	However,	he	also	has	a	deeper	
commitment	to	such	egalitarian	relationships.	We	should	care	about	such	relationships	‘not	
merely’	because	they	make	peoples	lives	go	better	but	because	they	are	required	by	justice	
even	when	(in	an	individual	instance54)	they	don’t	make	people’s	lives	go	better.	Unlike	O’Neill,	
this	is	not	because	they	are	thought	to	be	impersonally	valuable.	It	is,	rather,	that	they	are	
required,	and	not	in	a	way	that	feeds	of	their	personal	or	impersonal	value.	Thus,	the	
foundations	of	Schemmel’s	relational	egalitarianism	are	different	from	the	personal	value	and	
impersonal	value	views	that	we	have	thus	far	considered.	Rather,	his	relational	egalitarianism	
is,	at	root,	normative.	Ensuring	egalitarian	social	relationships	is	something	we	ought	to	do,	
but	not	because	(or	at	least	not	only	when)	they’re	good	(either	for	people	or	impersonally).	
	
Anderson	also	makes	comments	along	these	lines.	She	says,	for	example,	that	‘Egalitarians	
base	claims	to	social	and	political	equality	on	the	fact	of	universal	moral	equality…egalitarians	
seek	a	social	order	in	which	persons	stand	in	relations	of	equality.’55	She	also	says,	as	we	have	
seen,	that	distributive	patterns	should	not	be	seen	purely	as	instrumental	to	egalitarian	social	
and	political	relationships,	but	may	follow	from	or	be	demanded	by	them.	This	seems	to	put	
these	relationships	at	the	apex	of	the	normative	tree	–	it	isn’t	(just)	that	we	should	explain	why	
they	make	people’s	lives	go	well,	it	is,	rather,	that	we	should	start	from	these	relationships	as	
the	appropriate	way	to	live	together.	We	should	have	equal	social	relationships	because,	
morally,	we	are	equal.	
	
As	we	have	seen,	in	his	writings	on	equality,	Scanlon	seems	to	appeal	to	personal	value	or	
personal	reasons	in	articulating	why	we	should	care	about	egalitarian	relationships.	But,	whilst	
in	the	works	in	which	he	defends	relational	egalitarianism	he	does	not	link	back	to	his	broader	
moral	theory56,	and	in	his	most	famous	work	in	moral	theory	(What	We	Owe	to	Each	Other57)	
he	is	‘coy’	about	what	his	contractualism	demands	in	the	sphere	of	distributive	justice58,	we	
know,	of	course,	that	Scanlon	has	a	broader	methodological	framework	and	deeper	
																																								 																				
54	I	am	grateful	to	Schemmel	for	encouraging	me	to	make	this	paranthetical	qualification	–	he	would	
not	endorse	the	view	that	such	relationships	are	morally	important	in	a	world	where	they	are	in	general	
bad	for	people.	
55	Anderson,	‘What	is	the	Point?’,	313.	
56	Aaron	James	says	that	Scanlon’s	contractualism	is	‘at	best	peripheral	to	his	political	essays.’	Aaron	
James,	‘The	Significance	of	Distribution’	in	R.	Jay	Wallace,	Rahul	Kumar,	and	Samuel	Freeman	eds.,	
Reasons	and	Recognition:	Essays	on	the	Philosophy	of	T.	M.	Scanlon,	(New	York:	Oxford	University	
Press,	2011):	276-304,	at	p.	296,	n.1.	
57	T.M.	Scanlon,	What	We	Owe	to	Each	Other	(Cambridge,	Mass:	Belknap	Press,	1998).	
58	James,	‘The	Significance	of	Distribution’,	p.	276.	
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commitments:	contractualism	based	on	mutual	justification	and	reasonable	rejection.	At	the	
root	of	Scanlon’s	contractualism,	we	find	something	very	like	relational	equality	–	an	ideal	of	
people	living	together	in	a	justificatory	community,	where	they	live	by	principles	that	nobody	
could	reasonably	reject.	At	the	summit	of	Scanlon’s	theory	appears	to	be	an	idea	that	what	
matters	is	living	together	as	equals.	As	Aaron	James	puts	it,	‘If	Scanlon’s	theory	implies	that	
distributions,	as	such,	are	not	what	ultimately	matters,	it	also	tells	us	what	is	finally	at	stake:	
the	significance	of	distribution	depends	on	independently	valuable	relations	among	people.	
We	are	to	treat	others	as	they	are	owed,	by	acting	only	in	ways	we	could	justify	to	them,	
because	this	sustains	a	valuable	‘relation	of	mutual	recognition’	with	them.’59	Thus,	Scanlon’s	
demand	that	we	foster	egalitarian	relationships	through	our	distributions	may	immediately	be	
justified	with	reference	to	individual	wellbeing,	but	ultimately	the	justification	may,	if	we	
connect	it	with	his	contractualism,	find	its	termination	in	a	moral	ideal	of	equality	and	equal	
relationships	–	what	we	owe	to	each	other	is	what	we	can	justify	to	one	another,	and	we	ought	
to	justify	ourselves	to	one	another	because	only	then	can	we	live	together	as	equals.	James	
talks	about	justificatory	equality	as	‘independently	valuable’,	so	there	may	still	be	digging	to	do	
(what	kind	of	value	is	this?	presumably	impersonal?),	but	it	may	just	be	that	Scanlon	thinks	
that	all	moral	and	political	philosophy	must	proceed	from	an	idea	of	us	as	equals.	
	
This	normative	formulation	of	relational	egalitarianism	sees	the	idea	of	egalitarian	social	and	
political	relations	as	foundational.	The	point	of	equality,	to	use	Anderson’s	terms,	is	to	end	
oppression.	Oppression	is	objectionable	because	the	oppressor	doesn’t	treat	the	oppressed	as	
an	equal.	What	is	the	point	of	treating	a	person	as	an	equal?	There	isn’t	a	point.	It’s	just	what	
we’re	supposed	to	do:	we	should	treat	each	other	as	equals	because	we	are	equals.	On	this	
view,	political	theory	must	proceed	from	the	ideal	of	relational	equality,	not	explain	why	or	
how	it	is	valuable	or	important.	
	
IV	Relational	and	Distributive	Egalitarianism	
In	this	section	I	want	to	turn	my	attention	to	my	second	and	third	aims	as	stated	in	the	
introduction.	That	is,	I	want	to	look	at	whether	relational	egalitarianism,	in	the	various	guises	
outlined	above,	can	be	criticized	in	the	same	way	that	distributive	egalitarianism	is	criticized	–	
as	‘arithmetic’	and	‘abstract’	–	and	to	see	how	it	might	relate	to	distributive	egalitarianism,	to	
see	whether	there	is	room	for	both	understandings	of	equality	within	a	single	view,	as	Cohen	
appeared	to	believe.	We	saw	earlier	how	relational	egalitarians	have	complained	that	
																																								 																				
59	Ibid.,	p.	277,	quoting	Scanlon,	What	We	Owe	to	Each	Other,	p.	162.	Emphasis	in	original.	
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distributive	views	of	equality	are	overly	abstract	or	mysterious,	and	that	they	are	overly	
arithmetic,	focusing	on,	as	an	earlier	relational	egalitarian,	R.H.	Tawney,	put	it,	‘the	details	of	
the	counting	house’.60	We	have	also	seen,	broadly	speaking,	three	different	ways	of	viewing	
egalitarian	social	relationships.	Relational	egalitarians	claim	that	equality	is	a	value	that	is	
centrally	concerned	with	our	social	relationships.	These	relationships	may	have	personal	value	
(be	good	for	people),	have	impersonal	value	(be	good	regardless	of	their	contribution	to	
individual	lives),	or	be	required	by,	or	a	starting	point	for	theorizing	about,	justice.	Any	of	
these	ways	of	understanding	why	we	should	care	about	egalitarian	social	and	political	
relationships,	I	will	now	argue,	is	in	danger	of	either	lead	us	to	a	distributive	or	‘arthimetic’	
view,	or	is	abstract.	Furthermore,	each	is	compatible,	in	some	way,	with	distributive	
egalitarianism.	Therefore,	it	may	be	a	false	dichotomy	to	make	us	choose	between	the	
relational	and	distributive	understandings	of	equality.	
	
Let’s	take	the	personal	value	view	first.	On	this	view,	the	basic	claim	is	that	egalitarian	social	
relationships	make	people’s	lives	go	better	(and	makes	them	go	better	in	the	kind	of	way	that	
egalitarians	should	care	about).	I	think	this	is	true.	Consider	two	worlds	in	which	all	have	
equal	holdings	(and	their	level	of	holdings	is	the	same	in	both	worlds).	In	the	first,	everyone	
participates	on	an	equal	footing	and	relationships	are	characterized	by	healthy	fraternal	
relations.	In	the	other,	two	groups	take	it	in	turn	to	dominate	and	oppress	one	another.	It	
seems	to	me	that	the	people	in	the	first	world	have	better	lives	than	those	in	the	second.	
	
One	question	we	may	ask	is	how	‘perfectionist’	this	makes	the	relational	egalitarian	position.	
Many	of	the	forms	of	wellbeing	thought	to	be	promoted,	such	as	‘genuine	self-understanding’	
and	‘autonomy’	are	the	kinds	of	personal	values	that	we	would	associate	with	(a	liberal)	
perfectionism,	like	that	of	Joseph	Raz.61	These	accounts,	especially	those	that	adhere	to	the	
positive	view	that	egalitarian	social	relationships	are	good	for	us	(and	not	only	the	negative	
view	that	inegalitarian	relationships	are	bad	for	us)	seem	to	claim	superiority	for	those	
conceptions	of	the	good	that	make	space	for	such	relationships,	or	the	goods	that	they	are	
thought	to	promote.	Therefore,	we	are	encouraged	to	look	down	on	those	conceptions	of	the	
good	in	which	such	relationships	are	not	valued,	or	in	which	goods	like	autonomy	and	truthful	
living	do	not	play	a	central	role.	According	to	Scheffler,	we	are	to	value	these	relationships	
because	of	their	contribution	to	human	flourishing.	This	limits	the	extent	to	which	such	a	
view	can	claim	neutrality	between	conceptions	of	the	good.	This	seems	especially	relevant	in	
																																								 																				
60	R.H.	Tawney,	Equality	(London:	Allen	&	Unwin,	1964),	p.	113.	
61	Joseph	Raz,	The	Morality	of	Freedom	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1986).	
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Scheffler’s	case,	since	his	is	a	story	in	which	relational	egalitarianism	is	apparently	inspired	by,	
and	attributable	to,	Rawls,	whom	we	do	not	normally	associate	with	perfectionism.62	Of	
course,	Scheffler	offers	the	less	‘philosophically	venutresome’	account	of	the	value	of	
egalitarian	relationships	as	well,	and	perhaps	he	would	want	to	associate	Rawls	with	that	
account.63		
	
Let’s	imagine	that	it	is	true	that	egalitarian	social	relationships	are	indeed	good	for	us,	and,	
what	is	more,	good	for	us	in	the	kind	of	way	that	a	political	community	ought	to	care	about.	
All	we	have	learned	from	this	is	that	participation	in	egalitarian	social	relationships	is	either	a	
sui	generis	aspect	of	human	flourishing	or	wellbeing,	or	contributes	to	human	flourishing	or	
wellbeing.	This	doesn’t	tell	us	that	much	about	what	to	do,	or	which	states	of	affairs	are	more	
valuable	than	others.	It	tells	us	that,	all	else	equal,	if	we	want	to	promote	human	flourishing	or	
wellbeing,	we	should	promote	these	relationships.	All	political	philosophers	think	we	must	be	
attentive	to	what	makes	human	lives	to	go	well	along	some	metric	(though	that	metric	may	
not	be	or	concern	wellbeing	or	flourishing	in	any	thick	sense,	but	rather	to	some	political	
analogue	of	that64).	All	else	equal	(across	everything	else	that	matters)	if	we	can	make	people	
better	off,	we	ought	to.	But	once	we	have	identified	what	metric	we	care	about,	the	other	key	
question	is	how	we	ought	to	distribute	(the	means	to)	that	metric.	
	
For	example,	let’s	imagine	that	Scheffler	is	right,	that	egalitarian	social	relationships	promote	
‘truthful	living’.	Let	us	also	imagine	(implausibly,	and	for	illustrative	purposes)	that	this	is	the	
only	reason	we	should	promote	egalitarian	relationships,	and	that	truthful	living	is	all	that	
matters	in	making	a	life	go	well.	The	question	then	is:	‘how	should	we	distribute	the	means	to	
and/or	promote	truthful	living?’	We	know	that	it	is	valuable,	and	that	that	explains	why	we	
should	promote	egalitarian	social	relationships.	But	if	people	can	be	better	and	worse	
informed	about	life,	as	such	a	position	recognises,	there	will	then	be	questions	about	how	we	
should	view	different	distributions	of	truthful	living.	Should	we	maximize	it,	such	that	if	one	
person	could	know	everything	there	is	to	know,	that	would	be	as	good	as	lots	of	people	
																																								 																				
62	John	Rawls,	Political	Liberalism	(New	York:	Columbia	Univesity	Press,	1993).	
63	It	would	be	consistent	with	Rawlsianism	for	Scheffler	to	claim	that	egalitarian	relationships	are	
necessary	for	human	flourishing,	provided	that	that	fact	plays	no	role	in	grounding	the	claim	that	our	
political	institutions	ought	to	promote	or	support	such	relationships,	although	Scheffler	himself	does	
not	distance	his	claims	about	human	flourishing	from	his	political	view	of	equality.	It	would	also	be	
consistent	with	Rawlsianism	to	claim,	as	Anderson	does,	that	such	relationships	are	necessary	for	
liberty,	if	liberty	is	then	viewed	as	a	primary	social	good	–	i.e.,	an	all-purpose	good	required	for	most	
conceptions	of	the	good.	This	would	give	egalitarian	relationships	instrumental	value	whilst	taking	no	
stand	on	their	intrinsic	value	for	human	lives.	
64	For	example,	Rawls’s	primary	social	goods.	
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knowing	a	bit?	Or	should	we	equalise	it	–	or	at	least	find	value	in	people	having	equality	of	
access	to	truth?	Or	should	we	prioritise	giving	access	to	truth	to	those	who	currently	have	
less?	All	these	positions	are,	at	root,	distributive.	The	point	is	this:	if	egalitarian	social	
relationships	are	thought	to	be	valuable	or	important	because	of	their	contribution	to	human	
wellbeing,	and	it	is	then	thought	that	political	institutions	and	distributions	ought	to	be	
arranged	so	as	to	promote	or	realise	these	relationships,	this	shows	us	that	(these)	relational	
egalitarians	care	about	people’s	wellbeing	(and	think	our	political	institutions	ought	to	care	
about	this	kind	of	wellbeing)	and	that	this	care	extends	beyond	the	money	in	their	pockets	–	
in	other	words,	they	are	not	resourcists.65	But	lots	of	distributive	egalitarians,	including	
Cohen,	are	not	resource	egalitarians,	they	are	welfare	egalitarians.66	So	this	doesn’t	seem	to	be	
a	strike	against	the	distributive	egalitarian,	it	is	a	strike	against	resource-focussed	
egalitarianism,	which	cannot	take	account	of	the	way	that	a	financially	well-off	but	dominated	
person	is	badly	off.	
	
Once	we	have	identified	the	way	that	egalitarian	social	relationships	contribute	to	wellbeing,	
we	still	then	need	to	ask	‘what	principle(s)	should	guide	us	in	the	distribution	of	wellbeing?’	
Here	the	relational	egalitarian	must	seemingly	choose	between	(or	combine)	our	familiar	
distributive	principles:	egalitarianism,	sufficiency,	prioritarianism,	maximin,	or	
maximisation.67	They	might	not	proceed	directly	to	that	question	–	they	may,	for	example,	
seek	to	answer	it	through	some	contractual	method	–	but	their	claim	that	relational	
egalitarianism	contributes	to	human	wellbeing	or	flourishing	cannot	answer	that	question.	
Therefore,	this	kind	of	relational	egalitarianism	simply	poses	the	question	of	how	to	distribute	
the	means	to	a	good	life,	it	does	not	answer	it,	or	provide	our	answers	with	a	rationale.	So	
relational	egalitarians	who	see	egalitarian	relationships	as	being	important	because	they	have	
personal	value	should	not	criticise	distributive	egalitarians	for	having	at	root	a	distributive	
																																								 																				
65	For	the	classic	statement	of	a	resoucist	position,	see	Dworkin,	‘Equality	of	Resources’.	
66	More	strictly,	Cohen	offer	the	hybrid	metric	of	‘advantage’	as	the	metric	of	egalitarian	justice.	See	his	
‘On	the	Currency’.	For	a	more	strictly	welfarist	egalitarian	view,	see	Richard	Arneson,	‘Equality	and	
Equal	Opportunity	for	Welfare’	in	Philosophical	Studies	56	(1989):	77-93.	
67	Alexander	Brown	has	recently	criticized	O’Neill	in	particular	of	being	a	closet	distributive	egalitarian,	
since	O’Neill	invokes	self-respect	in	defence	of	relational	egalitarianism,	and	Brown	believes	this	shows	
O’Neill	to	be	a	distributive	egalitarian	with	a	self-respect	type	metric.	This	moves	too	fast	for	two	
reasons.	First,	it	ignores	O’Neill’s	comments	on	the	impersonal	value	of	social	relationships.	Second,	
O’Neill	is	at	most	committed	to	the	personal	good	of	(and	others	like)	self-respect,	and	his	relational	
egalitarianism	does	not	commit	him	to	an	egalitarian	distribution	of	those	goods,	let	alone	an	at	root	
distributive	egalitarianism.	(For	example,	O’Neill	might	think	we	ought	to	have	an	egalitarian	social	
relationships,	but	only	because	that	will	maximize	self-respect).	See:	Alexander	Brown,	‘What	Should	
Egalitarians	Believe	If	They	Really	Are	Egalitarians?’,	European	Journal	of	Political	Theory	(forthcoming),	
4-5.	
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view.	They	have	not	shown	that	their	view	is	not,	at	root,	distributive:	the	distributive	roots	
may	be	obscured	by	the	focus	on	the	contribution	that	certain	kinds	of	social	relationships	can	
make	to	individual	wellbeing,	but	distributivism	may	nevertheless	lurk	underneath.	Indeed,	
some	relational	egalitarians	may,	at	root,	be	(welfarist)	distributive	egalitarians.	And	certainly	
this	type	of	relational	egalitarianism	is	easily	combinable	with	distributive	views.	
	
This	puts	distributive	equality	and	relational	equality	in	an	interesting	relationship.	On	the	
one	hand,	they	can	be	articulated	as	competing	interpretations	of	the	same	value	–	namely,	
equality.	On	the	other	hand,	they	appear	to	be	answering	completely	different	questions,	and	
focusing	on	different	parts	of	political	philosophy.	Relational	egalitarians	are	focused	on	the	
question	of	what	(for	political	purposes)	is,	or	contributes	to,	a	good	life	–	what	is	it	that	our	
political	institutions	should	try	to	provide	for	us?	Distributive	egalitarians	are	focused	on	the	
question	of	how	we	should	distribute	the	means	to	what	(for	political	purposes)	is,	or	
contributes	to,	a	good	life.	This	makes	the	two	positions	potentially	complimentary.	
	
The	‘personal	value’	relational	egalitarian	could	still	criticise	the	distributive	egalitarian	for	
believing	equality	to	be	at	root	a	distributive	value,	if,	for	example,	they	thought	that	we	ought	
to	maximise	wellbeing	whilst	believing	that	egalitarian	social	relationships	provide	a	way	for	
us	to	do	this.	However,	the	relational	egalitarian	would	then	have	to	recognise	that	their	
position	is	not,	fundamentally,	an	egalitarian	one	–	their	commitment	to	equality	is	not	their	
fundamental	commitment,	their	commitment	to	maximising	wellbeing	is.	And	such	a	view	
seems,	ultimately,	as	distributive,	‘arithmetic’,	and	indeed	as	abstract,	as	the	distributive	
egalitarian	view.	
	
Of	course,	it	would	be	implausible	to	think	that	egalitarian	social	relationships	are	all	that	
there	is	to	living	a	good	life.	Therefore,	what	relational	egalitarians	of	this	type	have	identified	
is	one	contributing	factor	to	human	flourishing	or	wellbeing.	We	then	need	to	identify	the	
others,	and	decide	how	we	should	regard	differing	distributions	of	it,	and	different	
combinations	of	different	forms	of	wellbeing.	For	example,	imagine	that	both	happiness	and	
truthful	living	are	sui	generis	aspects	of	wellbeing.	We	then	not	only	need	to	decide	how	we	
should	view	differing	distributions	of	wellbeing	among	different	people,	but	also	different	
combinations	of	types	of	wellbeing	within	people.	
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Seeing	egalitarian	relationships	as	one	contributing	factor	to	wellbeing	(and	maybe	even	one	
contributing	factor	to	one	type	of	wellbeing)	does	not	mean	that	relational	egalitarianism	is	
not	an	important	project	or	insight.	But	it	does	place	the	personal	value	version	of	the	view	in	
context.	Even	if	it	can	be	housed	within	a	distributive	view,	though,	it	tells	us	something	
important	about	how	we	ought	to	proceed.	Distributivists	tend	to	operate	as	if	we	can	identify	
what	wellbeing	is,	and	then	decide	how	it	(or	the	means	to	it)	should	be	distributed.	But,	just	
as	utilitarians	provide	arguments	for	equality	based	on	the	diminishing	marginal	significance	
of	utility,	relational	egalitarians	provide	us	with	an	argument	for	distributive	equality	(broadly	
conceived)	based	on	the	contribution	of	such	distributions	to	certain	kinds	of	relationship,	
and	the	contribution	of	those	relationships	to	wellbeing.	This	view	shows	that	distributions	
(through	relationships)	can	impact	on	wellbeing,	and	so	we	should	not	view	the	wellbeing-
distribution	relationship	as	one-way	traffic.	However,	despite	the	importance	of	the	relational	
egalitarian	insight,	the	personal	value	view	makes	the	relational	egalitarian	project	seem	part	
of	a	distributive	view,	or	at	least	a	view	that	could	easily	be	incorporated	by	a	distributive	
view.	
	
What	if	egalitarian	social	relationships	are	instead,	as	per	O’Neill,	viewed	as	having	impersonal	
value?	In	this	case,	I	am	inclined	to	agree	with	Schemmel	that	such	a	view	seems	‘mysterious’.	
The	idea	of	impersonal	value	itself	is	sometimes	thought	to	be	mysterious.	Can	something	be	
valuable	even	though	it	is	not	good	for	anybody,	or	anything?	I	think	it	can	be,	though	this	
doesn’t	mean	that	I	find	the	view	non-mysterious	or	-abstract.	The	idea	of	impersonal	value	
seems	most	clear	when	the	value	is	completely	independent	of	human	lives.	Consider,	to	use	a	
well-known	example,	the	Grand	Canyon.	Aside	from	the	value	that	this	has	for	people,	it	
arguably	has	a	value	beyond	that.	Even	if	everyone	in	the	world	would	be	a	tiny	bit	better	off	if	
we	built	a	giant	parking	lot	in	the	Grand	Canyon,	that	would	seem	to	disrespect	the	inherent	
(and	impersonal)	value	that	it	holds.	Another	example	might	be	biodiversity.	Is	the	world	in	
which	a	common	big	cats	dies	as	bad	as	the	one	in	which	the	last	tiger	dies?	I	think	the	second	
may	well	be	worse,	and	it	is	hard	to	fully	spell	this	out	in	terms	which	relay	all	the	value	lost	
back	to	individual	lives	–	it	might	just	be	that	a	world	with	no	tigers	is	worse	than	a	world	with	
tigers,	even	if	it	isn’t	worse	for	anybody	or	anything.	
	
Thinking	about	impersonal	value	in	terms	of	human	affairs	(like	distributions	or	relationships	
between	people)	is	harder.	To	accept	that	such	values	exist	mean	recognising	that	we	can	and	
should	impact	on	human	lives	in	ways	that	are	not	good	for	any	of	those	lives.	The	values	to	be	
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promoted	are	of	human	lives,	but	not	valuable	for	human	lives.	Despite	the	apparent	
strangeness	of	these	ideas,	Larry	Temkin	shows	many	intuitive	cases	where	we	accept	that	a	
state	of	affairs	could	be	in	one	way	better,	even	though	it	is	worse	for	someone	and	better	for	
no	one.68	However,	these	are	largely	cases	where	the	distribution	has	some	value	(like	fairness)	
which	is	independently	valuable.	Thinking	about	interpersonal	relationships,	which	seem	
intimately	connected	with	individual	lives	and	identities,	in	terms	of	impersonal	value	is	a	still	
further	step,	and,	to	me,	seems	to	be	just	about	the	most	abstract	and	mysterious	claim	of	
impersonal	value	you	could	have.	Consider	your	relationships	with	your	nearest	and	dearest,	
and	then	consider	why	they’re	valuable.	Is	it	because	they	make	our	lives	better,	because	
they’re	the	appropriate	relationships	for	us	to	have,	or	because	they	simply	make	the	world	
better,	regardless	of	what	they	do	for	us?	The	latter	seems	the	most	mysterious	and	abstract	of	
these	views.	The	same	seems,	to	me	at	least,	true	of	social	relationships	too.	Can	the	value	of	
these	relationships	really	be	found	outside	our	lives?	
	
I	do	not	point	any	of	this	out	to	say	that	it	is	impossible	that	egalitarian	social	relationships	
have	impersonal	value.		But	it	is	certainly	an	abstract	and	mysterious	thought.	In	addition	to	
these	worries,	if	egalitarian	social	relationships	have	impersonal	value,	perhaps	we	should	not	
care	about	their	location	or	distribution.	Since	they	are	not	good	for	people,	perhaps	we	
should	not	care	who	they	obtain	between,	or	if	some	people	have	many	and	others	none	at	all.	
Imagine	a	society	where	Alice	views	everyone,	and	is	viewed	by	everyone,	as	an	equal.	But	
everyone	else’s	relationships	are	characterised	by	nasty	inegalitarian	elements.	Holding	the	
number	of	egalitarian/inegalitarian	social	relationships	fixed,	this	society	is	just	as	good,	from	
the	perspective	of	impersonally	valuable	relationships,	as	one	in	which	everyone	has	some	
egalitarian	social	relationships	and	some	inegalitarian	ones.	That	is,	unless	the	impersonal	
value	of	such	relationships	is	conditional	on	their	distribution,	or	there	are	impersonal	values	
embodied	in	the	distribution	of	such	relationships.	But	to	acknowledge	this	would	be	to	see	
distributions	of	goods	(certain	kinds	of	relationships)	as	holding	impersonal	value.	Aren’t	we	
back	in	mysterious,	abstract	and	arithmetic	territory	here?69	
	
The	main	point	is	this:	relational	egalitarians	(and	O’Neill	in	particular)	have	criticised	the	
distributive	egalitarian	view	for	being	undermotivated,	abstract	and	mysterious.	When	asked	
why	distributive	equality	is	valuable,	distributive	egalitarians	say	‘it	just	is’.	O’Neill	says	this	
isn’t	good	enough.	He	thinks	that	egalitarians	should	be	able	to	offer	reasons	for	why	
																																								 																				
68	Temkin,	‘Equality,	Priority	and	the	Levelling	Down	Objection’.	
69	I	am	grateful	to	Liam	Shields	for	useful	comments	here.	
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distributive	inequality	is	bad:	‘the	Non-Intrinsic	egalitarian	will	have	a	more	fully	elaborated	
account	of	why	and	how	inequality	is	bad,	of	a	kind	that	is	unavailable	to	the	Telic	egalitarian.	
It	is	to	the	credit	of	Non-Intrinsic	egalitarianism	that	this	makes	the	view	easier	to	defend.	On	
a	Non-Intrinsic	egalitarian	view,	the	skeptic	about	egalitarianism	can	be	countered	by	a	
detailed	account	of	the	variety	of	considerations	in	which	the	badness	of	inequality	is	
grounded.’70	
	
Yet,	if	we	push	O’Neill-style	relational	egalitarians	on	why	these	things	are	bad,	their	answer	
will	concern	the	value	of	egalitarian	social	relationships.	And	if	we	push	them	on	why	they’re	
so	good,	their	answer	will	be	(at	least	in	part)	‘they	just	are’.	Given	this,	are	they	on	much,	if	
any,	firmer	ground	than	the	distributive	egalitarian?	Perhaps	all	moral	claims	must,	
ultimately,	be	grounded	in	abstract	and	mysterious	claims.	Certainly	those	views	that	include	
claims	about	impersonal	value	seem	to	destined	to	be	abstract,	mysterious,	and	
metaphysically	controversial.	So	it	doesn’t	seem	a	consideration	in	favour	of	one	over	another	
that	the	other	is	abstract	and	mysterious.	Certainly	it	doesn’t	look	like	a	consideration	in	
favour	of	impersonal	relational	egalitarianism	over	distributive	egalitarianism.	
	
In	addition	to	arguing	that	relational	egalitarianism	is	a	superior	understanding	of	equality	to	
distributive	egalitarianism,	O’Neill	argues	that,	once	we	accept	relational	egalitarianism,	we	
see	that	Parfit’s	question	‘equality	or	priority?’	presents	us	with	a	false	dichotomy.71	This	is	
because,	alongside	our	relational	egalitarianism,	we	can	endorse	the	priority	distributive	view	
(the	view	that	the	worse	off	someone	is,	the	more	important	it	is	to	benefit	them).	In	the	
context	of	O’Neill’s	rejection	of	distributive	egalitarianism,	I	find	this	claim	strange.	Firstly	
because	if	we	can	endorse	the	priority	view	alongside	relational	egalitarianism,	why	can	we	
not	endorse	distributive	egalitarianism	alongside	her	relational	sister?	O’Neill	may	reply	that	
we	could	have	this	view,	as	a	matter	of	logical	consistency,	but	that	we	shouldn’t,	because	of	
the	arithmetic	nature	and	abstractness	of	the	distributive	egalitarian	view.	But	prioritarianism	
seems	to	bear	these	features	too	and,	in	addition,	as	Ingmar	Persson	makes	clear72,	the	priority	
view	entails	endorsing	a	kind	of	impersonal	value	directly	located	in	distributions,	which	is,	at	
least	partly,	what	seems	to	make	the	telic	egalitarian	view	abstract	and	mysterious.	
	
																																								 																				
70	O’Neill,	‘What	Should	Egalitarians	Believe?’,	133-134.	
71	Ibid.,	152-155.	
72	Ingmar	Persson,	‘Equality,	Priority	and	Person-Affecting	Value’	in	Ethical	Theory	and	Moral	Practice	4	
(2001):	23-39,	at	26-29.	
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Indeed,	as	an	aside,	we	needn’t	necessarily	choose	between	distributive	equality	and	the	
priority	view.	Much	of	the	recent	literature	on	distributive	ethics	has	concerned	whether	we	
should	be	egalitarians	or	prioritarians.	But	since	distributive	egalitarians	such	as	Cohen	are	
pluralists,	they	don’t	believe	equality	to	be	the	only	distributive	value.	Usually,	equality	is	
coupled	with	a	concern	for	something	like	‘efficiency’	or	‘total	wellbeing’	(i.e.,	some	kind	of	
maximizing	concern).	But	there	is	no	reason	why	a	concern	for	distributive	equality	shouldn’t	
be	coupled	with	the	priority	view	in	the	stead	of	this	maximizing	concern.	Indeed,	I	am	
tempted	to	endorse	such	a	view:	the	worst	off	are	entitled	to	support	both	because	they’re	on	
the	wrong	side	of	inequality,	and	because	they’re	worse	off	in	absolute	terms.	
	
Let	us	turn	now	to	the	justice-based	understanding	promoted	most	clearly	by	Christian	
Schemmel.	Schemmel	claims	that	his	view	is,	in	its	foundations,	the	same	as	that	of	Anderson	
and	Scheffler.73	However,	as	I	have	tried	to	show,	when	they	try	to	show	the	importance	of	
egalitarian	social	relationships,	both	Anderson	and	Scheffler	at	least	in	part	focus	on	why	such	
relationships	are	good	for	us,	or	at	least	why	the	absence	of	domination	and	oppression	is	good	
for	us.	This	suggests	a	(partly)	personal	value-based	view,	rather	than	a	justice-based,	or	
ultimately	normative,	view.	
	
Again,	like	the	version	of	relational	egalitarianism	based	on	impersonal	value,	this	view	is	
perhaps	abstract.	Consider	justifications	to	citizens	of	forms	of	political	arrangement	designed	
to	foster	egalitarian	social	relationships	that	may	be	detrimental	to	their	wellbeing,	but	that	
are	justified	on	the	basis	that	a	society	has	an	obligation	to	foster	such	relationships.	Unlike	
the	previous	view,	in	which	the	promotion	of	egalitarian	social	relationships	was	justified	on	
the	basis	that,	while	things	may	be	worse	for	the	citizen,	they	would	be	better	all	things	
considered	better,	here	the	claim	is	that	things	may	be	worse,	but	that	we	have	an	obligation	to	
make	things	worse.	I	don’t	think	that	this	makes	the	view	implausible	–	it	is	a	familiar	thought	
to	non-consequentialists.	But	it	does	perhaps	make	it	abstract	and	mysterious,	which	is	exactly	
what	some	relational	egalitarians	have	suggested	is	wrong	with	distributive	egalitarianism.	
After	all,	what	exactly	is	the	basis	of	the	idea	that	people	ought	to	be	treated	as	equals,	given	
that	we’ve	ruled	out	that	it	is	in	their	interests,	or	that	the	equal	distribution	of	certain	things	
(like	self-respect)	is	valuable	in	and	of	itself?	If	the	moral	importance	of	egalitarian	social	
relationships	is	simply	a	foundational,	unjustified	claim,	a	theoretical	starting	point,	then,	like	
distributive	egalitarianism,	it	seems	abstract.	I	have	italicized	the	words	seems	in	the	foregoing	
																																								 																				
73	Schemmel,	‘Why	Relational	Egalitarians	Should	Care	About	Distributions’,	365.	
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sentence,	because	I	am	a	little	unsure	of	my	ground	here.	That	is	because	I	am	a	little	unsure	
about	what,	exactly,	the	charge	of	abstraction	is,	or	why	abstraction	is	a	bad	thing	in	a	political	
philosophical	claim.	But	since	‘mystery’	and	‘abstraction’	feature	so	heavily	in	O’Neill	and	
Scanlon’s	attacks	on	distributive	equality,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	relational	views	appear	to	
carry	these	features.74	
	
Schemmel’s	normative	view	also	seems	to	leave	space	for	distributive	egalitarianism.	It	says	
that	relational	concerns	create	normative	prescriptions	which	bound	permissible	action.	This	
may	(and	Schemmel	thinks	will)	include	prescriptions	about	distributions.	But	we	can	imagine	
that	relational	egalitarianism	will	create	limits	to	distributions,	such	that	there	will	be	a	
plurality	of	distributions	which	meet	the	relational	criteria	(Schemmel	believes	that	this	range	
will	be	narrower	than	most	relational	egalitarians,	since	he	thinks	that	the	distributive	
prescriptions	will	be	quite	precise).	However,	within	that	permissible	range	(however	wide	or	
narrow),	we	could	still	find	a	place	for	distributive	egalitarianism.	For	example,	many	would	
accept	that	normative	injunctions	against	killing	prevent	that	being	used	as	a	means	to	
realising	equality.	In	the	relational	egalitarian	case,	we	should	not	promote	distributive	
equality	in	ways	that	would	involve	disrupting	people’s	rights	to	be	seen	and	treated	as	an	
equal.	In	other	words,	Schemmel’s	view	doesn’t	seem	to	directly	oppose	distributive	
egalitarianism,	but	rather	may	simply	place	(egalitarian)	limits	on	it.	Indeed,	Cohen	thinks	
something	like	this,	as	he	believes	that	community	considerations	veto	luck	egalitarian-
approved	inequalities.75	This	is	also	one	way	to	read	Jonathan	Wolff’s	relational	egalitarianism.	
Wolff’s	‘Freedom,	Respect	and	the	Egalitarian	Ethos’76	is	sometimes	placed	alongside	
Anderson	and	Scheffler’s	papers	as	a	group	of	influential	relational	egalitarian	critiques	of	luck	
																																								 																				
74	I	am	grateful	to	the	members	of	Mancept,	and	Liam	Shields	in	particular,	and	Christian	Schemmel	for	
pushing	me	toward	greater	clarity	here,	or	at	least	greater	acknowledgement	of	my	unclarity	and	
uncertainty.	
75	This	reading	is	suggested	by	Why	Not	Socialism?,	p.	12:	‘The	community	principle	constrains	the	
operation	of	the	egalitarian	principle	by	forbidding	certain	inequalities	that	the	egalitarian	principle	
permits.’	And	p.	37:	‘Do	the	relevant	[community-based]	prohibitions	merely	define	the	terms	within	
which	[distributive]	justice	will	operate,	or	do	they	sometimes	(justifiably?)	contradict	justice?’	My	
emphases.	I	would	have	expected	Cohen	to	see	community	and	justice	as	in	tension	and	a	need	to	
intuitively	balance	their	competing	demands,	but	he	seems	to	see	community	as	placing	firm	limits	on	
the	pursuit	of	justice	(i.e.,	distributive	equality).	It	is	worth	noting,	to	avoid	confusion,	that	Schemmel	
and	Cohen	have	very	different	understandings	of	what	kinds	of	claims	claims	of	justice	are.	So	when	
Schemmel	says	relational	considerations	are	justice	considerations,	he	means	that	they	have	a	certain	
priority	or	weight	–	a	priority	or	weight	which	Cohen	does	not	accord	to	justice,	which	is	(for	example)	
overridden	by	community.	On	this	aspect	of	Cohen’s	work,	see	my	‘Internal	Doubts	about	Cohen’s	
Rescue	of	Justice’,	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy	18	(2010):	228-247.	
76	Jonathan	Wolff,	‘Fairness,	Respect	and	the	Egalitarian	Ethos’,	Philosophy	&	Public	Affairs	27	(1998):	
97-122.	
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egalitarianism.77	However,	Wolff’s	paper	is	importantly	different.	It	says	that	there	are	
(egalitarian)	limits,	based	on	respect	(about	the	way	we	see	and	treat	one	another),	to	the	
pursuit	of	distributive	fairness.	But	that	position	doesn’t	deny	that	distributive	fairness	or	
equality	is	a	value.78	
	
A	distributive	egalitarianism	may	enter	Scanlon’s	contractualist	view	in	a	slightly	different	
way.	Aaron	James	has	argued	that	contractualism	cannot	support	a	distributive	theory	like	
luck	egalitarianism,	since	contractualism	focuses	on	the	personal	reasons	we	can	put	forward	
to	one	another	in	favour	of	or	against	particular	principles,	principles	that	define	what	we	owe	
to	each	other,	whilst	‘a	distribution	taken	as	such,	cannot	be	owed,	and	so	cannot	be	justice’.79	
However,	leaving	aside	questions	of	terminology	(i.e.,	whether	or	not	luck	egalitarianism	can	
be	a	theory	of	justice)	it	can	certainly	still	get	a	look	in.	Scanlon	explicitly	allows	that	not	all	
personal	reasons	(the	reasons	we	must	traffic	in	in	order	to	work	out	what	we	owe	to	each	
other)	are	reasons	grounded	in	wellbeing.	For	example,	reasons	grounded	in	fairness	are	
admissible.	Scanlon	writes	that	‘We	have	reason	to	object	to	principles	simply	because	they	
arbitrarily	favor	the	claims	of	some	over	others:	that	is	to	say,	because	they	are	unfair.’80	What	
is	it	for	a	principle	to	‘arbitrarily	favor’	some	over	others?	Scanlon	doesn’t	say,	but	the	luck	
egalitarian	focus	on	those	factors	over	which	we	have	no	control	or	responsibility	is	a	plausible	
contender	here.	So	luck	egalitarianism	may	qualify	as	a	theory	of	fairness,	which	can	ground	a	
personal	reason	which	can	be	put	forward	within	an	egalitarian	justificatory	framework	to	
work	out	matters	of	justice	(what	we	owe	to	each	other).	Of	course,	we	may	put	forward	other	
personal	reasons	to	be	concerned	about	distributions,	for	example,	whether	they	lead	to	
objectionable	relationships,	but	reasons	of	fairness	can	still	play	a	role	in	evaluating	which	
principles	we	can	and	can’t	reasonably	reject.	
	
To	sum	up	this	section,	the	most	tangible,	least	abstract	of	the	explanations	as	to	why	
egalitarian	social	relationships	are	valuable	is	to	explain	the	contribution	that	these	
relationships	(or	the	absence	of	their	opposites)	make	to	human	lives	going	well.	They	are	the	
																																								 																				
77	Wolff	himself	notes	this	in	his	‘Fairness,	Respect	and	the	Egalitarian	Ethos	Revisited’,	Journal	of	Ethics	
14	(2010):	335-350.	
78	See	ibid.	
79	James,	‘The	Significance	of	Distribution’,	p.	276.	Emphasis	in	original.	
80	Scanlon,	What	We	Owe	to	Each	Other,	p.	216.	See	also:	James,	‘The	Significance	of	Distribution’,	p.	
280	(which	notes	Scanlon’s	comments	on	fairness);	and	p.	281	(where	the	method	employed	by	
distributive	theorists	is	described	as	‘at	best	incomplete’,	not	ruling	out	a	potential	role	within	
contractualism).	On	p.	282	James	acknowledges	that	one	will	have	some	personal	reason	to	be	
compensated	for	bad	luck,	but	he	bases	these	on	personal	welfare,	rather	than	fairness.	
	 29	
most	immediate	and	easy	to	grasp	reasons	for	thinking	these	relationships	important.	But	
these	answers	may	point	us	(a)	toward	(a	thin)	perfectionism;	and	(b)	onwards	to	distributive	
theories	about	how	we	should	view	different	distributions	of	wellbeing	or	the	means	to	it.	
Certainly	these	views	are	not	opposed	to	distributive	views,	and	could	easily	be	housed	within	
them.	Claims	about	the	impersonal	value	of	relationships	will	be	abstract,	and	in	O’Neill’s	
view	appear	to	be	coupled	with	distributive	views,	that	are	also	abstract	(one	of	which	may	be	
distributive	egalitarianism).	Finally,	normative	views	are	potentially	abstract,	in	that	they	
claim	that	we	ought	to	do	something	to	people,	including	trying	to	formulate	certain	kinds	of	
relationship,	but	not	because	this	is	in	those	people’s	interests.	In	addition,	such	a	view	seems	
to	leave	space	for	distributive	egalitarianism,	either	within	the	bounds	of	relational-friendly	
distributions,	or	as	a	personal	reason	put	forward	within	an	egalitarian	justificatory	
relationship.	
	
V	Concluding	Remarks	
In	this	chapter	I	have	sought	to	contribute	to	the	debate	about	equality	which	is	often	framed	
as	being	about	distributive	or	relational	equality.	I	have	tried	to	do	this	by,	first,	asking	‘what	is	
the	point	of	egalitarian	social	relationships?’,	and	showing	that	relational	egalitarians	seem	to	
offer	a	variety	of	different	answers	to	this	question.	Second,	I	have	tried	to	show	that	some	of	
the	worries	that	some	relational	egalitarians	have	with	distributive	egalitarianism	may	be	
found	in	the	relational	egalitarianisms	as	well.	Finally,	and	relatedly,	I	have	tried	to	show	that	
all	relational	egalitarian	theories	are	compatible	with	some	role	for	distributive	egalitarianism,	
and	some	relational	egalitarian	theories	–	those	which	focus	on	how	egalitarian	relationships	
improve	individual	lives	–	may	even	presuppose	the	need	for	(independent)	distributive	
principles.	This	final	conclusion	is,	I	think,	in	the	spirit	of	G.A.	Cohen	in	two	ways.	The	first	is	
that	Cohen,	as	I	pointed	out	at	the	start,	had	various	commitments	which	point	toward	some	
combination	of	distributive	and	relational	egalitarianism.	The	second	is	that	Cohen	was	a	
pluralist,	and	in	articulating	his	luck	egalitarian	beliefs	he	was	always	keen	to	emphasize	that	
he	was	trying	to	articulate	one	value	among	a	plurality81	(or,	indeed,	one	part	of	one	value	
among	a	plurality82).	So	Cohen	often	emphasized	that	we	are	not	always	forced	to	choose	
between	seemingly	competing	conceptions	or	principles.	As	I	have	tried	to	show,	this	may	be	
true	of	relational	and	distributive	versions	of	egalitarianism.	
																																								 																				
81	See	his	‘methodological	preliminaries’	in	‘On	the	Currency’,	908-912.	
82	In	Rescuing	(p.	7)	Cohen	states	that	the	luck	egalitarian	principle	is	a	principle	of	justice,	but	that	
unjust	inequalities	may	be	permissible	because	of	non-justice	considerations	and	non-distributive	
justice	considerations.	
